Ghostwire/ Dossiers /APT15 (RIVER CASTLE)
Threat actor profile · suspected China-nexus espionage

APT15 (RIVER CASTLE)

Google renamed APT15 RIVER CASTLE in July 2026 [4]; Microsoft tracks the activity as Nylon Typhoon [12]. For more than a decade the cluster has targeted foreign ministries and diplomats in Europe, the Americas and Asia. Vendors still disagree about its boundaries, including whether Ke3chang and Vixen Panda belong with APT15 or APT25 [5][15]. In July 2026 Intrusion Truth tied it to a PLA unit and to a contractor’s anonymity network; a 2023 procurement notice confirms the contractor’s sale, but not the unit or the network [1][2][3].

Source review: 20 November 2026

How to read the edge types

Each edge shows what kind of claim links a name or campaign to the cluster. A vendor renaming its own tracking, one vendor mapping another’s name, a disputed overlap, and a claim from a single source are different kinds of evidence.

same cluster a vendor’s own rename or merge, or its direct attribution vendor cross-map a vendor maps its name to APT15, or attributes under another name overlap / disputed shared methods or infrastructure, or another vendor disagrees single-source claim one source, not corroborated in this set

Intersection map

Select a name or campaign to jump to its evidence. The full evidence tables are also below.

NAMES · WHO USES THEM CORE CLUSTER CAMPAIGNS AND INFRASTRUCTURE TOOLS RIVER CASTLE Google GTIG / Mandiant same cluster [4][5] Nylon Typhoon Microsoft · formerly NICKEL same cluster [12][10] BRONZE PALACE Secureworks (Sophos) · BRONZE DAVENPORT · BRONZE IDLEWOOD same cluster [13] Ke3chang FireEye (2013); ESET vendor cross-map [34][38][6][5] Vixen Panda CrowdStrike vendor cross-map [9][5] Flea Symantec vendor cross-map [14] Red Vulture PwC (since 2021) vendor cross-map [15][16][17] APT25 Google / Mandiant · Uncool · Sushi Roll · Tor overlap / disputed [5][10][15] BackdoorDiplomacy ESET; Palo Alto Unit 42 · Playful Taurus (Unit 42) overlap / disputed [31][29][30] GREF Lookout; ESET overlap / disputed [26][27] Unit 61046 / 8th TRB Intrusion Truth only · “CSF 8th Bureau” single-source claim [1][2][48] RIVER CASTLE / APT15 Google GTIG name since Jul 2026 [4] Nylon Typhoon (Microsoft) · Ke3chang · Vixen Panda Suspected China-nexus espionage [5][13] unit attribution: Intrusion Truth only [1][2] Mirage campaign 2012 · oil, energy, military [39][35] Mirage Operation Ke3chang 2010–13 · European MFAs [38] BS2005 TidePool 2012–16 · Indian embassies [37] TidePool UK government contractor 2017 · NCC Group [36] RoyalCli/DNS Okrum / Ketrican 2015–19 · diplomatic missions [34] Okrum NICKEL court action 2019–21 · Americas, Europe [10][11] Leeson Canadian mining 2021 · Recorded Future [45] Graphican 2022–23 · Americas MFAs [14] Graphican Iran government 2022 · Turian · Unit 42 [30] Turian EU government body Jan 2023 · ESET [29] KetriADS Mobile surveillance Tibetans, Uyghurs · BadBazaar [25][27][28] BadBazaar Foreign-affairs targeting 2023 · Microsoft MTAC [24] Guatemala government 2025 · U.S.–Guatemala review [23] Relay networks SPACEHOP · RedRelay · ORBs [18][16][20][22] RedRelay SPACEHOP Guangdong Chanming 2023 notice · 2026 claims [3][51][1][2] WHIPWEAVE EDGE = TYPE OF ATTRIBUTION same cluster (a vendor’s own rename / merge, or direct attribution) vendor cross-map / attribution under another name overlap only, or disputed by another vendor single-source claim (Intrusion Truth) government statement tool or network also tied to other clusters [n]= source number in the list below
Left: public names and the basis for linking each to APT15. Right: campaigns and the relay infrastructure reported for the cluster. Inclusion does not mean every item is attributed to APT15; the edge style says how strong each link is.

Names

Names that look like aliases are not all equivalent. Google files Ke3chang and Vixen Panda under APT25, while CrowdStrike, Microsoft, MITRE and Secureworks map them to APT15 [5][9][12][6][13]. Third-party lists add names whose origin they cannot explain [7][8].

NameWho uses itRelationship to APT15TypeSources
RIVER CASTLEGoogle GTIG / MandiantGoogle’s 2026 name for its own APT15 cluster: “APT15 → RIVER CASTLE” [4]. Google’s profile page gives APT15 no aliases and says its backdoors and infrastructure “are not unique to the group” [5].same cluster[4][5]
Nylon Typhoonformerly NICKELMicrosoftMicrosoft renamed its own NICKEL cluster Nylon Typhoon in 2023 [12]. In 2021 it described “some common activity” with APT15, APT25 and KeChang [10]; its current table maps Nylon Typhoon to APT15, ke3chang, VIXEN PANDA, Playful Dragon, RedRiver and Mirage, and no longer lists APT25 [12].same cluster[12][10]
BRONZE PALACEBRONZE DAVENPORT · BRONZE IDLEWOODSecureworks (Sophos)Secureworks merged two of its own clusters into BRONZE PALACE and maps it to APT15, Ke3chang, NICKEL and Vixen Panda; “moderate confidence” that it “operates on behalf of China” [13].same cluster[13]
Ke3changFireEye (2013); ESETFireEye’s 2013 report named the campaign but never uses “APT15” [38]. ESET: “The Ke3chang group, also known as APT15” [34]. MITRE files the group under this name [6]. Google’s own page lists Ke3chang under APT25 instead [5].vendor cross-map[34][38][6][5]
Vixen PandaCrowdStrikeCrowdStrike’s profile maps Vixen Panda to APT15, ke3chang, NICKEL, Nylon Typhoon and Red Vulture [9]. Google lists Vixen Panda under APT25 [5].vendor cross-map[9][5]
FleaSymantec“The Flea (aka APT15, Nickel)” [14]. The basis given is tool lineage (Graphican descends from Ketrican); no mapping method is stated.vendor cross-map[14]
Red VulturePwC (since 2021)PwC’s name, defined as “Ke3chang, APT15, APT25, NICKEL” [15], and the actor PwC tied to the RedRelay proxy network [16][17]. It covers APT25 as well as APT15. Intrusion Truth repeats it [1].vendor cross-map[15][16][17]
APT25Uncool · Sushi Roll · TorGoogle / MandiantGoogle’s page lists “Vixen Panda, Ke3chang” under APT25, not APT15 [5]. Microsoft 2021 and PwC fold both APT15 and APT25 into one cluster [10][15]. Google’s 2026 rename table omits APT25 [4]. The two names are not interchangeable.overlap / disputed[5][10][15]
BackdoorDiplomacyPlayful Taurus (Unit 42)ESET; Palo Alto Unit 42ESET: BackdoorDiplomacy and APT15 “use the same techniques and tactics” [31], and links Ke3chang to it “with low confidence” [29]. Unit 42 merges them under Playful Taurus with no stated basis [30]. MITRE keeps them separate (G0135) [6].overlap / disputed[31][29][30]
GREFLookout; ESETLookout ties its mobile actor to GREF, “also … referred to as APT15” [26]. ESET: “we are currently unable to link GREF to APT15” and tracks it separately [27].overlap / disputed[26][27]
Unit 61046 / 8th TRB“CSF 8th Bureau”Intrusion Truth onlyThe unit itself is documented: a 2017 Haidian government record lists “61046部队(三部八局)”, Unit 61046 as the Third Department’s 8th Bureau [48], matching Project 2049, which inferred a focus on Europe and “perhaps” the Middle East, Africa and Latin America from linguists’ skills [40]. The link to APT15 is Intrusion Truth’s alone: it adds “Unit 61046 and CSF 8th Bureau” as aliases [1] and says the 8th TRB “is responsible for APT15 activity” [2]. No vendor or government makes this attribution, and no source places the bureau in the post-2024 Cyberspace Force, whose reconnaissance bases are regional, not numbered [49][50].single-source claim[1][2][48]

RedRelay and the procurement trail

Intrusion Truth’s July 2026 posts chain several claims together, from a procurement notice to “the 8th TRB is responsible for APT15 activity.” Each step rests on different evidence. Ghostwire retrieved the procurement notices from the Internet Archive, including a second Chanming award that Intrusion Truth does not quote; they confirm the purchases, but not the buyers’ units or the products’ identity.

Every cyber-related notice Ghostwire found, plus the Cyberspace Force’s supplier actions, is on the PLA cyber procurement page.

StepClaimWhat it rests onStrength
1A Beijing military unit sought an “anti-traceback anonymous network system” service in 2023 and ranked Guangdong Chanming first.Primary procurement notice, archived July 2025 [3].Documented
2Chanming is a real Foshan information-security company.Registry aggregator, recruiting page, provincial tech-SME list [41].Documented (secondary registries)
2bChanming won a second military award in March 2024, a “network access platform” for an unnamed unit in Haikou, Hainan; Project 2049 placed a major 8th Bureau office in Haikou.Primary procurement notice found by Ghostwire’s archive crawl [51]; Project 2049 [40]. The notice names no unit or product, so the Haikou overlap is consistent with the unit claim, not evidence of it.Documented award; link inferred
2cAnti-traceback network services are a recurring military purchase.A separate June 2024 tender sought a “反溯源匿名网络专线服务” for three users, with the provider assisting “information collection” on specific organizations and people [52]. No supplier named.Documented tender
3Chanming’s product grew out of the FCN tunnel tool published by one of its founders.Intrusion Truth’s comparison of FCN and STN interfaces, code and binaries [1].Single source
4FCN-derived WHIPWEAVE connects to an ORB network called Orbweaver.Symantec, with no actor attribution [19].Documented (vendor)
5Chanming’s product is RedRelay.Intrusion Truth: “presumably RedRelay” [1]. The notice names no product brand [3].Inference
6The buyer is Unit 61046, the 8th Technical Reconnaissance Base.Intrusion Truth says the customer was “listed as Unit 61046” [2]; the archived notice names only “北京市某单位” in Haidian [3]. That Unit 61046 is the 3PLA 8th Bureau is documented [48][40]; the address Intrusion Truth gives matches public records [48]. Its post-2015 placement is only “assessed” [49], and “8th Technical Reconnaissance Base” appears in no other source [50].Unit identity documented; buyer link not shown
7The 8th TRB is APT15.Leaked eDiary files from an unnamed source, plus a domain cited from a Bitdefender paper that never mentions APT15 [2][32]. Intrusion Truth’s own hedge: “either … using the same infrastructure as APT15 … or the 8th TRB is APT15” [2]. Project 2049’s inferred regional focus is consistent with APT15’s foreign-ministry targeting, but is not evidence of it [40].Single source, hedged
8APT15 uses RedRelay.PwC ties Red Vulture (APT15 and APT25) to RedRelay [16]; Intrusion Truth’s “we do know” cites nothing [2]. Relay networks are shared by multiple groups [18].Documented for Red Vulture; not exclusive
Groups share relay networks. Mandiant describes these networks as run by contractors and rented to several China-nexus groups, “not controlled by a single APT actor” [18]. PwC described RedRelay as “used by multiple threat actors” [16]. Traffic through RedRelay or ORBWEAVER does not by itself identify APT15 or any PLA unit.

Tools

Groups share tools and infrastructure, so a tool is not proof of attribution. Google says APT15 “uses backdoors and infrastructure that are not unique to the group” [5]. The BS2005 lineage (TidePool, RoyalCli, Ketrican, Graphican) is the most consistent thread across vendors [37][36][14]. A dashed border marks tools or networks that sources also tie to other clusters.

BS2005 · BMW · MyWeb

Windows backdoors communicating over HTTP through the Internet Explorer COM interface; file transfer and shell.

Where seen
Operation Ke3chang, 2010–2013.
Attribution and other users
FireEye (Ke3chang) [38]. BS2005 is the ancestor of TidePool, RoyalCli and Ketrican [37][36][14]; CrowdStrike also lists it for Vixen Panda [9].

[38][37][9]

Mirage / MirageFox

shared

Windows remote-access trojan (Visual C++) that profiles the host and runs commands.

Where seen
Mirage campaign, 2012; MirageFox, 2018.
Attribution and other users
SecureWorks named no actor [39]; Intezer: “high confidence” APT15 [35]. Shares code with Reaver, which Intezer says is used by other Chinese government-affiliated groups [35]. Mirage is also used as an alias for the group itself [6].

[39][35][36]

TidePool

Windows RAT: file operations, command execution, HTTP C2.

Where seen
Indian embassy personnel, 2012–2015.
Attribution and other users
Unit 42 (Ke3chang) [37]. Malpedia also links DragonOK; not verified here.

[37]

RoyalCli · RoyalDNS · spwebmember

RoyalCli: backdoor evolved from BS2005, using IE injection. RoyalDNS: backdoor with C2 over DNS TXT records. spwebmember: .NET SharePoint database dumper.

Where seen
UK government contractor, 2017.
Attribution and other users
NCC Group (APT15) [36].

[36]

Okrum · Ketrican · KetriADS · Ketrum

Okrum: DLL backdoor with its payload hidden in a PNG. Ketrican: backdoor descended from BS2005; KetriADS loads it from an alternate data stream. Ketrum: Ketrican/Okrum hybrid.

Where seen
Diplomatic missions 2015–2019; EU government body Jan 2023.
Attribution and other users
ESET (Ke3chang) [34][29]; Intezer (APT15) [33].

[34][29][33]

Leeson · Neoichor · NumbIdea · NullItch · Rokum

Windows backdoors; several use the IE COM interface for C2.

Where seen
NICKEL operations to 2021.
Attribution and other users
Microsoft (NICKEL) [10].

[10]

Graphican · EWSTEW

Graphican: backdoor using the Microsoft Graph API and OneDrive for C2, evolved from Ketrican. EWSTEW: extracts sent and received mail from Exchange.

Where seen
Foreign ministries in the Americas, 2022–2023.
Attribution and other users
Symantec (Flea) [14]. The Graph-API C2 technique was also used by APT28’s Graphite, a technique overlap, not a shared tool [14].

[14]

Turian · Quarian

shared

Windows (and Linux) backdoor: reverse shell, C2 update, system information.

Where seen
BackdoorDiplomacy from 2017; Iran government 2022.
Attribution and other users
BackdoorDiplomacy (ESET) [31]; Playful Taurus = APT15 per Unit 42 [30]; ESET rates the Ke3chang–BackdoorDiplomacy link low confidence [29]. Turian’s network encryption is “nearly identical” to a Calypso backdoor’s [31].

[31][30][29]

BadBazaar

shared

Android and iOS surveillanceware: location, contacts, SMS, call recording (Android).

Where seen
Tibetan and Uyghur targets, 2018–2024.
Attribution and other users
Lookout: APT15 (“high confidence”, iOS) [25]; ESET: GREF, tracked separately [27]; NCSC names no actor [28]. Shares infrastructure with DoubleAgent [25]. MOONSHINE, often discussed alongside it, is credited to POISON CARP [25].

[25][27][28]

SilkBean · DoubleAgent · CarbonSteal · GoldenEagle

shared

Android surveillance families.

Where seen
Uyghur targets, reported 2020.
Attribution and other users
Lookout ties them to a mobile actor overlapping GREF / APT15 [26]. CarbonSteal later spread to other operations [44], and not every actor targeting Uyghurs or Tibetans is APT15 [44].

[26][44]

RedRelay / ORBWEAVER

shared

Covert proxy (ORB) network of relay nodes used to hide the origin of intrusions. Infrastructure, not malware.

Where seen
Tracked by PwC from 2021; rebuilt March 2022.
Attribution and other users
PwC: “used by multiple threat actors”, including Red Vulture [16][17]. Mandiant names ORB1/ORBWEAVER without naming users and says ORBs are contractor-run and shared [18]. The RedRelay = ORBWEAVER equation comes from Intrusion Truth and Symantec’s “Orbweaver”, not from PwC or Mandiant [1][19].

[16][18][19][1]

SPACEHOP / ORB3

shared

Relay network used for reconnaissance scanning and exploitation.

Where seen
Jan 2019 – May 2024.
Attribution and other users
Mandiant: used by “APT5 and APT15” [18].

[18]

WHIPWEAVE

sharedpublic / open-source base

Tunnelling client “likely derived from the open-source Chinese VPN Free Connect (FCN) project” that connects to the Orbweaver ORB network.

Where seen
Reported by Symantec, Aug 2024.
Attribution and other users
Symantec attributes it to no actor [19]. Intrusion Truth equates the “bulbature” file with WHIPWEAVE, calls it “a core component” of RedRelay, and traces FCN to a Chanming co-founder [1]. FCN was public on GitHub, so code overlap alone does not identify a user.

[19][1]

GOREshell

shared

reverse_ssh-based backdoor.

Where seen
South Asian government entity, Oct 2024.
Attribution and other users
SentinelOne’s PurpleHaze cluster, “loosely” associated with actors overlapping APT15 and UNC5174 [20].

[20]

Public and dual-use tools

public / open-source base

Mimikatz and variants, Quarks PwDump, Lazagne, SharpSecDump; web shells China Chopper, Behinder, Godzilla, AntSword; leaked EternalBlue-family exploits and DoublePulsar; impacket.

Where seen
Across campaigns.
Attribution and other users
Used by many actors; they show method, not identity [14][31][2].

[14][31][2]

Campaign history

WhenVectorWhat the source saysAttributed bySources
Nov 2023 and Mar 2024 notices; Jul 2026 claimsProcurement of an “anti-traceback anonymous network system”A Beijing military unit ranked Guangdong Chanming first for an anonymity network service in 2023 [3], and an unnamed unit in Haikou did so for a “network access platform” in 2024 [51]. Intrusion Truth says this product is RedRelay and the buyer is Unit 61046 [1][2]. See the evidence chain.Intrusion Truth only, for the RedRelay and unit links [1][2][3][51][1][2]
2019–2026Relay (ORB) networksMandiant: SPACEHOP used by “APT5 and APT15” [18]. PwC: Red Vulture’s use of RedRelay, rebuilt March 2022 [16]. SentinelOne: an ORB network used by “several” actors, “particularly” one overlapping APT15 [20][21]. BSI: the group uses its own obfuscation networks [22]. Mandiant: such networks “are not controlled by a single APT actor” [18].Several vendors; infrastructure is shared [18][16][20][18][16][20][22]
Reported 29 Apr 2025Not statedA U.S.–Guatemala joint review “identified the presence of advanced persistent threat APT-15 … within certain Guatemalan government systems” [23].U.S. Department of Defense with Guatemala (government statement) [23][23]
Jun–Dec 2023Not statedForeign-affairs entities in Brazil, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Peru, Portugal, France, Spain, Italy and the UK; some IT companies [24].Microsoft (Nylon Typhoon) [24][24]
2018–2024Trojanized appsBadBazaar on Android and iOS against Tibetans and Uyghurs; iOS variant “attributed with high confidence” to APT15 [25]. ESET tracks the Android campaign’s operator GREF separately [27]; the 2025 NCSC advisory names no actor [28].Lookout (APT15); disputed by ESET [25][27][25][27][28]
Jan 2023Not statedKetriADS loader with a new Ketrican variant, plus Okrum, against an EU government body [29].ESET (Ke3chang) [29][29]
Jul–Dec 2022Not statedUpdated Turian backdoor; several Iranian government networks “have likely been compromised” [30].Unit 42 (Playful Taurus, merged with BackdoorDiplomacy) [30][30]
Late 2022 – early 2023Not stated; toolset includes a CVE-2020-1472 (Netlogon) exploitForeign ministries mainly in the Americas, a finance department, a corporation and one European victim [14].Symantec (“Flea (aka APT15, Nickel)”) [14][14]
2021Not stated“infrastructure previously linked to APT15” targeting a Canada-based mining company [45].Recorded Future (infrastructure link) [45][45]
Sept 2019 – Dec 2021Compromised VPN suppliers, phished credentials, unpatched Exchange and SharePoint, a Pulse Secure zero-day (no CVE IDs given)Governments, diplomatic entities and NGOs in the Americas and Europe; Microsoft obtained a U.S. court order to take control of NICKEL websites [10][11].Microsoft (NICKEL; “some common activity” with APT15, APT25, KeChang) [10][10][11]
2015–2019Not determinedKetrican and Okrum against diplomatic missions in Slovakia, Belgium, Chile, Guatemala and Brazil; 2015 Ketrican activity in Croatia and the Czech Republic [34].ESET (Ke3chang, “high confidence”) [34][34]
2017; reported Mar 2018Not stated; re-entry via stolen VPN certificateIntrusion at a contractor providing services to the UK government; RoyalCli and RoyalDNS evolved from BS2005; SharePoint and Exchange dumping [36].NCC Group (APT15) [36][36]
2012–2015 samples; reported 2016Office exploit CVE-2015-2545TidePool RAT against “Indian embassy personnel worldwide”; “an evolution of the BS2005 malware family” [37].Unit 42 (“related to the original Operation Ke3chang”) [37][37]
2010–2013Spear-phishing; CVE-2012-4681 (Java, zero-day at the time), CVE-2010-3333, CVE-2010-2883“nine compromises at government ministries in five different European countries,” Syria-themed lures before the 2013 G20 [38].FireEye (“Ke3chang”; identities “remain unknown”) [38][38]
2012 (tracked from Apr 2012)Spear-phishing with fake-PDF droppersMirage RAT against an oil company in the Philippines, a Taiwanese military organization, a Canadian energy company and targets in Brazil, Israel, Egypt and Nigeria [39].SecureWorks names no actor; the APT15 link is later reporting [35][36][39][35]

Chinese-language and PRC sources

Government response. The Foreign Ministry’s press conferences of 28–31 July 2026 contain no question on Intrusion Truth, APT15 or Guangdong Chanming. The ministry’s usual answer to hacking accusations reads: “中方坚决反对并依法打击黑客活动,同时坚决反对出于政治目的散布虚假信息” (China firmly opposes and cracks down on hacking in accordance with the law, and firmly opposes spreading disinformation for political purposes) [43]. That quotation comes from a different case and is shown only as the standard formula.

Chinese security vendors. No Chinese vendor in this set tracks APT15 under its own name. It appears in Chinese only through translations of Western research, and 360’s APT naming scheme covers only foreign groups [46].

The company. 广东蝉鸣信息科技有限公司 (Guangdong Chanming Information Technology), registered in Nanhai District, Foshan, in August 2016, formerly 广州蝉鸣, describes itself as an information-security start-up [41]. Its name appears first among three candidates in the 2023 notice “反溯源匿名网络系统服务项目” (anti-traceback anonymous network system service project) at ¥30,000 per year [3], and first in a March 2024 “网络接入平台” (network access platform) award for an unnamed unit in Haikou at ¥90,000 [51]. A June 2024 tender from another unit for an anti-traceback network service shows the same category of purchase, with bidders required to have experience on military, state-security and public-security cyber projects [52]. Ghostwire found no Chinese-language coverage of the Intrusion Truth story [46].

Ghostwire vulnerability cross-check

CVEs named in the reporting on this cluster. None is in Ghostwire’s vulnerability records, which hold few CVEs from before 2020, and the CNNVD lookup was blocked from outside China [47]. Microsoft’s 2021 NICKEL reporting names no CVE IDs [10]. Several CVEs that appear near APT15 in relay-network reporting belong to other clusters, such as CVE-2022-27518 (APT5) and CVE-2024-8963 (UNC5174) [18][20], and are not listed here.

CVEProductWhere reportedGhostwire recordCNNVD / CNVD
CVE-2010-3333Microsoft Word (RTF stack overflow)Ke3chang lures, 2010–2013 [38]Not in Ghostwire’s recordsLookup blocked [47]
CVE-2010-2883Adobe Reader (CoolType)Ke3chang lures, 2010–2013 [38]Not in Ghostwire’s recordsLookup blocked [47]
CVE-2012-4681Oracle Java 7Ke3chang; exploited before a patch existed [38]Not in Ghostwire’s recordsLookup blocked [47]
CVE-2015-2545Microsoft Office (EPS)TidePool against Indian embassies [37]Not in Ghostwire’s recordsLookup blocked [47]
CVE-2020-1472Netlogon (Zerologon)Exploit in the Flea / Graphican toolset [14]Not in Ghostwire’s recordsLookup blocked [47]
CVE-2020-5902F5 BIG-IP TMUIBackdoorDiplomacy initial access (overlap only, not APT15 directly) [31]Not in Ghostwire’s recordsLookup blocked [47]
CVE-2020-0688Microsoft ExchangeScript in the leaked eDiary, per Intrusion Truth only [2]Not in Ghostwire’s recordsLookup blocked [47]

What no source in this set establishes

Sources

Source review: 20 November 2026. Each entry says how it was checked: read in full, read through a summarizing fetch tool, excerpt only, or could not be opened.

  1. Intrusion Truth, “Dear Diary, Today I found a Ghost in the Network,” 27 Jul 2026. Read in full. Source for Guangdong Chanming as developer of the FCN / “STN Security Tunnel” tool, for “a file known as bulbature — also known in the wild as the WHIPWEAVE malware”, for WHIPWEAVE as “a core component” of RedRelay (“or ORBWEAVER”), and for the claim to “add two more aliases to the list: Unit 61046 and CSF 8th Bureau.” Its alias sentence lists one cluster’s names; some coverage misread it as “almost a dozen” groups [42]. Romanizes the company’s legal representative’s name in a way that does not match the characters it prints. intrusiontruth.wordpress.com
  2. Intrusion Truth, “Turns out the Ghost was the PLA,” 28 Jul 2026. Raw page read in full. Source for “the customer listed as Unit 61046 was otherwise known as the 8th TRB”; eDiary files from an unnamed “trusted source” found “a few years back”; “vpnkerio”, which it calls “a domain believed to be used exclusively by APT15” while linking a Bitdefender paper that never mentions APT15 [32]; the hedge “either the 8th TRB is using the same infrastructure as APT15 … or the 8th TRB is APT15”; and the admission that “the eDiary was a dead end for our investigation into Guangdong Chanming and RedRelay.” Its sentence “we do know that the 8th TRB/APT15 does use it” cites nothing. intrusiontruth.wordpress.com
  3. 军队采购网 (PLA procurement portal, run by the CMC Logistic Support Department), “反溯源匿名网络系统服务项目成交公示” (award announcement, anti-traceback anonymous network system service project), project 2023-JWHJCM-F4005, published 30 Nov 2023. The live site timed out from outside China; read in full from Internet Archive captures of 25 Jul 2025 and 27 Jul 2026, which are byte-identical. Lists 广东蝉鸣信息科技有限公司 as first candidate at ¥30,000 per year, ahead of two other suppliers, for an unnamed buyer, “北京市某单位”, in Haidian, Beijing. It does not name Unit 61046 or RedRelay, and records candidates, not a delivered contract. The page notes that correction notices exist; they were not captured. Personal contact details omitted. Archived notice
  4. Google Threat Intelligence Group, “Updated Cyber Threat Actor Naming System,” 24 Jul 2026, table added 30 Jul. Read in full (Ghostwire’s stored copy and raw page). Table 2: “APT15 → RIVER CASTLE”. APT25 is not in the table. Caveat: “direct, apples-to-apples comparisons between threat actors are rarely possible.” cloud.google.com
  5. Google Cloud, “APT groups” profile page, undated. Raw page read in full. APT15 has no “also known as” line and the page says APT15 “uses backdoors and infrastructure that are not unique to the group, making attribution challenging.” The APT25 entry reads “Also known as: Uncool, Vixen Panda, Ke3chang, Sushi Roll, Tor.” cloud.google.com
  6. MITRE ATT&CK, group G0004 “Ke3chang,” v3.1, modified 31 Jul 2026. Read (tool excerpts). Associated groups: “APT15, Mirage, Vixen Panda, GREF, Playful Dragon, RoyalAPT, NICKEL, Nylon Typhoon,” each cited to NCC Group, Intezer or Microsoft. BackdoorDiplomacy is a separate group, G0135. attack.mitre.org
  7. Malpedia (Fraunhofer FKIE), actor “APT15.” Read. Aliases include BRONZE PALACE, Ke3Chang, Mirage, NICKEL, Nylon Typhoon, Playful Dragon, RIVER CASTLE, Red Vulture, RedRiver, Royal APT, VIXEN PANDA, plus Lurid, Metushy and Social Network Team, whose origin no primary source in this set explains. malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de
  8. ETDA / ThaiCERT Threat Group Card “Ke3chang, Vixen Panda, APT 15, GREF, Playful Dragon,” last changed 16 Aug 2025. Raw page read in full. Merges BackdoorDiplomacy (ESET), Playful Taurus (Palo Alto) and PurpleHaze (SentinelOne) into the card, which MITRE and MISP keep separate; marks the origin of Metushy and Social Network Team “(?)”. apt.etda.or.th
  9. CrowdStrike, adversary profile “VIXEN PANDA,” undated. Excerpt only. “VIXEN PANDA is a suspected China state-nexus adversary”; community identifiers include APT15, ke3chang, NICKEL, Nylon Typhoon, Red Vulture and BRONZE PALACE; malware listed as iWebRAT, Mirage, Lingbo, BS2005 and MagicFire. crowdstrike.com
  10. Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center, “NICKEL targeting government organizations across Latin America and Europe,” 6 Dec 2021. Read (tool summary). “MSTIC has been tracking NICKEL since 2016 and observed some common activity with other actors known in the security community as APT15, APT25, and KeChang.” Initial access via compromised third-party VPN suppliers, spear-phished credentials, unpatched on-premises Exchange and SharePoint, and a since-patched Pulse Secure VPN zero-day; no CVE IDs are given. Malware: Leeson, Neoichor, NumbIdea, NullItch, Rokum. microsoft.com
  11. Tom Burt, Microsoft, “Protecting people from recent cyberattacks,” 6 Dec 2021. Read (tool summary). Court order from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia (filed 2 Dec) taking control of NICKEL websites targeting organizations in “the United States and 28 other countries.” Lists “KE3CHANG,” “APT15,” “Vixen Panda,” “Royal APT” and “Playful Dragon.” The “42 domains” figure seen in coverage is not in Microsoft’s post; the court filings could not be opened. A private civil action is not a government attribution. blogs.microsoft.com
  12. Microsoft, “How Microsoft names threat actors,” page dated 12 Nov 2026. Read in full. Row: “Nylon Typhoon | China | NICKEL, VIXEN PANDA, Playful Dragon, RedRiver, ke3chang, APT15, Mirage.” APT25 is no longer listed. learn.microsoft.com
  13. Sophos (Secureworks CTU), threat profile “BRONZE PALACE,” undated. Excerpt only. Aliases include BRONZE DAVENPORT and BRONZE IDLEWOOD (its own merged clusters), APT15, Ke3chang, NICKEL, Nylon Typhoon, Playful Dragon, Vixen Panda. “CTU researchers assess with moderate confidence that BRONZE PALACE operates on behalf of China.” sophos.com
  14. Symantec Threat Hunter Team, “Flea Uses New Backdoor That Leverages Microsoft Graph API,” 21 Jun 2023. Read (tool summary). “The Flea (aka APT15, Nickel) advanced persistent threat (APT) group continued to focus on foreign ministries”; activity late 2022 to early 2023, mainly foreign ministries in the Americas. Graphican is “an evolution of the known Flea backdoor Ketrican.” Tools include EWSTEW and a CVE-2020-1472 exploit. security.com
  15. PwC, “Cyber Threats 2021: A Year in Retrospect” (Japanese edition). PDF read; English edition returned HTTP 403. 「Red Vulture (別名:Ke3chang、APT15、APT25、NICKEL)」 — Red Vulture, also known as Ke3chang, APT15, APT25, NICKEL. Cites an internal PwC report dated July 2021. pwc.com (PDF)
  16. PwC, “Cyber Threats 2022: A Year in Retrospect” (Japanese edition). PDF read; English edition returned HTTP 403. 「PwC は Red Vulture(別名 APT15、APT25、Ke3chang)による RedRelay の利用を分析した」 — PwC analysed Red Vulture’s use of RedRelay; says Red Vulture rebuilt its RedRelay cluster in March 2022. The English edition, seen only as a search excerpt, calls RedRelay “a proxy network, used by multiple threat actors.” pwc.com (PDF)
  17. Mandiant, “Stealth Mode: Chinese Cyber Espionage Actors Continue to Evolve Tactics to Avoid Detection,” 18 Jul 2023. Excerpt only. “PwC also reported that it observed Chinese cyber espionage actor Red Vulture using a shared proxy network dubbed RedRelay in 2021 and 2022.” cloud.google.com
  18. Michael Raggi, Mandiant, “IOC Extinction? China-Nexus Cyber Espionage Actors Use ORB Networks to Raise Cost on Defenders,” 22 May 2024. Read (tool summary). ORB networks are “administered by independent entities, contractors, or administrators within the People’s Republic of China” and “are not controlled by a single APT actor.” Names ORB1 / ORBWEAVER without naming its users; says ORB3 / SPACEHOP “has facilitated network reconnaissance scanning and vulnerability exploitation conducted by China-nexus threat actors, including APT5 and APT15.” cloud.google.com
  19. Symantec Threat Hunter Team, “Cloud Cover: How Malicious Actors Are Leveraging Cloud Services,” 7 Aug 2024. Raw page read in full. “The attackers used a tunneling tool known as Whipweave … likely derived from the open-source Chinese VPN Free Connect (FCN) project, to connect to an Operational Relay Box (ORB) network known as Orbweaver.” Attributes Whipweave and Orbweaver to no actor; does not mention APT15 or “bulbature”. security.com
  20. SentinelLABS, “Follow the Smoke: China-nexus Threat Actors Hammer At the Doors of Top Tier Targets,” 9 Jun 2025. Live page blocked (HTTP 429); read in full from an Internet Archive capture. “We loosely associate some PurpleHaze intrusions with actors that overlap with the suspected Chinese cyberespionage groups publicly reported as APT15 and UNC5174”; an ORB network “used by several suspected Chinese cyberespionage actors, particularly a threat group that overlaps with public reporting on APT15.” sentinelone.com
  21. SentinelOne, “Edge Decay: How a Failing Perimeter Is Fueling Modern Intrusions,” 9 Apr 2026. Read in full from Ghostwire’s stored copy. Names “activity linked to groups like APT15 and Hafnium” as examples of relay networks used “to dynamically rotate attack paths, making attribution more difficult.” sentinelone.com
  22. Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), “Aktive APT-Gruppen,” as of 14 Apr 2026. Excerpt only. “APT15 Vixen Panda / Mirage / Ke3chang / Nylon Typhoon”; “Die Gruppe nutzt eigene Verschleierungsnetzwerke aus kompromittierten Routern und VPN-Servern” (the group uses its own obfuscation networks of compromised routers and VPN servers). No state-unit attribution. bsi.bund.de
  23. U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, “United States and Guatemala identify cyber espionage threats linked to China in joint security review,” 29 Apr 2025. Live page HTTP 403; read in full from an Internet Archive capture. The review “identified the presence of advanced persistent threat APT-15, also known as Vixen Panda, Nickel, and Nylon Typhoon, within certain Guatemalan government systems,” a group “associated with China.” Names no unit, tools or CVEs. gt.usembassy.gov
  24. Microsoft Threat Analysis Center, East Asia report, Apr 2024. PDF read (Nylon Typhoon section). June–December 2023: “Nylon Typhoon has continued its long-running practice of targeting foreign affairs entities,” naming Brazil, Guatemala, Costa Rica and Peru, and Portugal, France, Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom; “some IT companies were also compromised.” microsoft.com (PDF)
  25. Lookout, “BadBazaar” (consolidated page), 22 Jan 2024. Read in full. iOS variant “attributed with high confidence to the Chinese hacking group APT15,” targeting Tibetans and Uyghurs; DoubleAgent shares infrastructure. Credits MOONSHINE to POISON CARP, not APT15. lookout.com
  26. Lookout, “Mobile APT Surveillance Campaigns Targeting Uyghurs,” Jun 2020. Read from an Internet Archive capture (excerpts searched). Ties SilkBean, DoubleAgent, CarbonSteal and GoldenEagle to a mobile actor through infrastructure overlapping GREF, “also … referred to as APT15, Ke3chang, Mirage, Vixen Panda and Playful Dragon.” lookout.com (PDF)
  27. Lukas Stefanko, ESET, “BadBazaar espionage tool targets Android users via trojanized Signal and Telegram apps,” 30 Aug 2023. Read (tool summary). “we are currently unable to link GREF to APT15 … continue tracking GREF as a separate group.” welivesecurity.com
  28. NCSC (UK) and partners, “Advisory: BADBAZAAR and MOONSHINE,” 9 Apr 2025. Read (tool summary). Names no actor (“malicious cyber actors”). ncsc.gov.uk
  29. ESET, APT Activity Report Q4 2022–Q1 2023, May 2023. PDF read (Ke3chang section). A new Ketrican variant via the KetriADS loader, plus Okrum, against an EU government body in January 2023; “with low confidence, Ke3chang is linked to BackdoorDiplomacy.” ESET’s later APT reports through Q1 2026 were searched and contain no Ke3chang, APT15, BackdoorDiplomacy or GREF mentions. welivesecurity.com (PDF)
  30. Unit 42, “Playful Taurus Leverages Turian Backdoor in New Campaign,” 18 Jan 2023. Read (tool summary). “Playful Taurus, also known as APT15, BackdoorDiplomacy, Vixen Panda, KeChang and NICKEL”; several Iranian government networks “have likely been compromised” (July–December 2022). No basis given for merging BackdoorDiplomacy. unit42.paloaltonetworks.com
  31. Adam Burgher, ESET, “BackdoorDiplomacy: Upgrading from Quarian to Turian,” 10 Jun 2021. Read (tool summary). “BackdoorDiplomacy and APT15 use the same techniques and tactics to drop their backdoors”; victims compromised by methods that “closely matched the Rehashed Rat and a MirageFox-APT15 campaign.” Initial access included CVE-2020-5902 (F5 BIG-IP). welivesecurity.com
  32. Bitdefender, BackdoorDiplomacy whitepaper and blog, 6 Dec 2022. Whitepaper downloaded and searched. Attributes only to BackdoorDiplomacy and never mentions APT15, Ke3chang, Vixen Panda or Nickel. On the domain Intrusion Truth relies on: “One such domain we believe is support.vpnkerio[.]com as other subdomains of vpnkerio[.]com are connected to the mentioned threat actor.” bitdefender.com (PDF)
  33. Intezer, “The Evolution of APT15’s Codebase 2020,” 21 May 2020. Read (tool summary). Ketrum is “a mix of the Ketrican and Okrum backdoors.” intezer.com
  34. Zuzana Hromcová, ESET, “Okrum: Ke3chang group targets diplomatic missions,” 18 Jul 2019. Read (tool summary). “The Ke3chang group, also known as APT15, is a threat group believed to be operating out of China”; Okrum operated by Ke3chang “with high confidence.” Initial access “a question that remains to be answered.” welivesecurity.com
  35. Jay Rosenberg, Intezer, “MirageFox: APT15 Resurfaces With New Tools Based On Old Ones,” 14 Jun 2018. Live URL 404; read from an Internet Archive capture. “There is high confidence that MirageFox can be attributed to APT15”; shares code with Mirage and Reaver. intezer.com
  36. NCC Group, “APT15 is alive and strong: An analysis of RoyalCli and RoyalDNS,” 10 Mar 2018. Read (tool summary). A 2017 intrusion at “our client, which provides a range of services to UK Government”; “APT15 is also known as, Ke3chang, Mirage, Vixen Panda GREF and Playful Dragon.” nccgroup.com
  37. Unit 42, “Operation Ke3chang Resurfaces With New TidePool Malware,” 22 May 2016. Read (tool summary). Targets “Indian embassy personnel worldwide”; CVE-2015-2545; TidePool “is an evolution of the BS2005 malware family.” unit42.paloaltonetworks.com
  38. Villeneuve et al., FireEye, “Operation Ke3chang: Targeted Attacks Against Ministries of Foreign Affairs,” Dec 2013. PDF read in full from an Internet Archive capture. “nine compromises at government ministries in five different European countries”; active “since at least 2010”; CVE-2012-4681, CVE-2010-3333, CVE-2010-2883. “their exact identities and motivation remain unknown.” Does not use the name APT15. fireeye.com (PDF)
  39. Dell SecureWorks CTU, “The Mirage Campaign,” 18 Sep 2012. Read in full from an Internet Archive capture. Targets in the Philippines, Taiwan, Canada, Brazil, Israel, Egypt and Nigeria; names no actor. The APT15 link comes from later reporting [35][36]. secureworks.com
  40. Mark Stokes, Jenny Lin and L.C. Russell Hsiao, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Signals Intelligence and Cyber Reconnaissance Infrastructure,” Project 2049 Institute, Nov 2011. Read in full. “Eighth Bureau (61046 Unit). Nestled in Hanjiachuan [韩家川], the Eighth Bureau is adjacent to Third Department headquarters in Beijing’s northwest suburbs.” On focus it hedges: “Based on language capabilities of members assigned, the Eighth Bureau appears to focus on Western and Eastern Europe and perhaps rest of world (e.g. Middle East, Africa, and Latin America).” It does not tie the bureau to computer network exploitation: “Specific Third Department bureaus with responsibilities for CNE remain opaque.” It uses “Bureau”, not “Base”. project2049.net (PDF)
  41. Registry details for 广东蝉鸣信息科技有限公司: CMMI中文网 (third-party aggregator; read in full) gives registration 16 Aug 2016, registered capital ¥5 million, Nanhai District, Foshan, former name 广州蝉鸣信息科技有限公司, 38 insured staff (2023 annual report). A Liepin recruiting page describes “一家信息安全领域初创型高科技企业” (an information-security start-up). The company appears as no. 463 on Guangdong’s 2023 batch-5 list of registered tech SMEs. Official registries (Qichacha, Tianyancha) blocked automated access. Individual names are omitted here. cmmizw.com · liepin.com · gdktzx.com (PDF)
  42. Catalin Cimpanu, Risky Business, “Risky Bulletin: New Chinese cyber contractor identified,” 29 Jul 2026. Excerpt only. Secondary; repeats part 1 and says RedRelay was “used by almost a dozen Chinese APT groups,” listing names that are aliases of one cluster. risky.biz
  43. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs regular press conferences, 28–31 Jul 2026 (read in full; no question on Intrusion Truth, APT15 or Chanming), and 27 Aug 2026, Lin Jian, on a separate U.S. domain action (read in full): “中方坚决反对并依法打击黑客活动,同时坚决反对出于政治目的散布虚假信息。” (China firmly opposes and cracks down on hacking in accordance with the law, and firmly opposes spreading disinformation for political purposes.) Shown as the ministry’s standard formula, not a response to this case. Official statement; partisan. mfa.gov.cn
  44. Pwnie, NetAskari, “Guest article: The Future-Past of digital espionage – APT15,” 3 Oct 2026. Read in full from Ghostwire’s stored copy. Secondary review of Lookout and FireEye reporting; notes that tools such as CarbonSteal proliferated to other operations and that “not every entity that targets Uyghur and Tibetan are automatically APT15.” netaskari.substack.com
  45. Recorded Future Insikt Group, “Critical minerals and cyber operations,” 23 Apr 2026. Read in full from Ghostwire’s stored copy. “In 2021, Insikt Group identified infrastructure previously linked to APT15, a Chinese state-sponsored threat actor targeting a Canada-based mining company.” recordedfuture.com
  46. Chinese-language material checked: 安全客 (Anquanke) translations of Intezer’s MirageFox research, 22 and 24 Jun 2018 (read; labelled “本文是翻译文章”, a translation); 360’s 2024 global APT report (PDF searched: no APT15, Ke3chang, Vixen, Nylon or Nickel; its APT-C-xx scheme lists only foreign groups). No Chinese vendor in this set tracks APT15 under its own name, and no Chinese-language coverage of the Chanming story was found. anquanke.com
  47. CNNVD vulnerability search API (cnnvd.org.cn), queried 20 Nov 2026 for the CVEs in this dossier. Every request returned HTTP 405 from outside China, and Ghostwire’s China-exit proxy was unavailable. No CNNVD or CNVD IDs are claimed on this page.
  48. Chinese public records on 61046部队. Haidian District government disclosure, 2017 winter-relief donation list for Qinglongqiao subdistrict units, index 11F/2017-08589, 19 May 2017 (read in full): row “61046部队(三部八局)” — Unit 61046 (Third Department, 8th Bureau). Xinhua, 27 Aug 2014, Xi Jinping commendation order naming a “61046部队研究员” (read). Nankai University careers page for “61046部队”, address “北京市海淀区遗光寺8号院”, undated (read). A 2003 recruitment repost describes it as a “总参直属高科技科研部队” (high-tech research unit directly under the General Staff) working on mathematics, communications, signals, satellites, computers and foreign languages (unofficial repost). None states a regional focus, a cyber role, or its place after 2015. bjhd.gov.cn · xinhuanet.com · nankai.edu.cn
  49. John Costello and Joe McReynolds, “China’s Strategic Support Force: A Force for a New Era,” NDU China Strategic Perspectives 13, Oct 2018. NDU URL returned HTTP 403; read in full from an Internet Archive capture. Table 3: “Eighth Bureau (Beijing) — Assessed to be transferred to NSD” (the SSF Network Systems Department); “only three of the former bureaus can be fully confirmed to have moved into the NSD.” Does not mention 61046. ndupress.ndu.edu (PDF)
  50. John Costello, “The Cyberspace Force: A Bellwether for Conflict,” Jamestown China Brief vol. 25 no. 8, 25 Apr 2025. Read in full. The Cyberspace Force has “five regional ‘Technical Reconnaissance Bases’ (TRB; 技术侦查基地)” built partly from former 3PLA bureaus, named Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern and Central, not numbered. Does not mention the 8th Bureau, 61046 or APT15. The April 2024 reorganization that created the Cyberspace Force is also described by IISS and Jamestown (Dahm). jamestown.org (PDF) · IISS · Jamestown (Dahm)
  51. 军队采购网, “网络接入平台采购(二次招标)中标结果公告” (award announcement, network access platform procurement, second tender), project 2023-JYBNOX-F1003, published 21 Mar 2024. Read in full from an Internet Archive capture of 28 Jul 2026, found by Ghostwire’s crawl of archived notices. First candidate 广东蝉鸣信息科技有限公司 at ¥90,000, ahead of 杭州安恒信息技术股份有限公司 (¥153,000) and a third supplier; buyer “某部” (a certain unit), Haikou, Hainan. Names no unit and no product brand. Evaluator names and contact details omitted. Archived notice
  52. 军队采购网, “反溯源匿名网络专线服务采购项目招标公告” (tender, anti-traceback anonymous network dedicated-line service), project 2024-JWHJNH-F4004, published 20 Jun 2024. Read in full from an Internet Archive capture of 21 Aug 2026. Describes “境外互联网络安全访问服务” (secure access to foreign internet) that prevents users being “被境外有关机构追踪” (tracked by relevant foreign agencies), and says the provider will “辅助对特定机构、人员相关信息的信息搜集工作” (assist in collecting information on specific organizations and people). Three users for one year; budget ¥180,000; bids delivered in Yuexiu District, Guangzhou; bidders need classified-systems qualifications and a record on “军队(国安、公安)网络安全项目” (military, state-security and public-security cyber projects). A tender, so no supplier is named. Contact details omitted. Archived notice