BS2005 · BMW · MyWeb
Windows backdoors communicating over HTTP through the Internet Explorer COM interface; file transfer and shell.
- Where seen
- Operation Ke3chang, 2010–2013.
Google renamed APT15 RIVER CASTLE in July 2026 [4]; Microsoft tracks the activity as Nylon Typhoon [12]. For more than a decade the cluster has targeted foreign ministries and diplomats in Europe, the Americas and Asia. Vendors still disagree about its boundaries, including whether Ke3chang and Vixen Panda belong with APT15 or APT25 [5][15]. In July 2026 Intrusion Truth tied it to a PLA unit and to a contractor’s anonymity network; a 2023 procurement notice confirms the contractor’s sale, but not the unit or the network [1][2][3].
Each edge shows what kind of claim links a name or campaign to the cluster. A vendor renaming its own tracking, one vendor mapping another’s name, a disputed overlap, and a claim from a single source are different kinds of evidence.
Select a name or campaign to jump to its evidence. The full evidence tables are also below.
Names that look like aliases are not all equivalent. Google files Ke3chang and Vixen Panda under APT25, while CrowdStrike, Microsoft, MITRE and Secureworks map them to APT15 [5][9][12][6][13]. Third-party lists add names whose origin they cannot explain [7][8].
| Name | Who uses it | Relationship to APT15 | Type | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RIVER CASTLE | Google GTIG / Mandiant | Google’s 2026 name for its own APT15 cluster: “APT15 → RIVER CASTLE” [4]. Google’s profile page gives APT15 no aliases and says its backdoors and infrastructure “are not unique to the group” [5]. | same cluster | [4][5] |
| Nylon Typhoonformerly NICKEL | Microsoft | Microsoft renamed its own NICKEL cluster Nylon Typhoon in 2023 [12]. In 2021 it described “some common activity” with APT15, APT25 and KeChang [10]; its current table maps Nylon Typhoon to APT15, ke3chang, VIXEN PANDA, Playful Dragon, RedRiver and Mirage, and no longer lists APT25 [12]. | same cluster | [12][10] |
| BRONZE PALACEBRONZE DAVENPORT · BRONZE IDLEWOOD | Secureworks (Sophos) | Secureworks merged two of its own clusters into BRONZE PALACE and maps it to APT15, Ke3chang, NICKEL and Vixen Panda; “moderate confidence” that it “operates on behalf of China” [13]. | same cluster | [13] |
| Ke3chang | FireEye (2013); ESET | FireEye’s 2013 report named the campaign but never uses “APT15” [38]. ESET: “The Ke3chang group, also known as APT15” [34]. MITRE files the group under this name [6]. Google’s own page lists Ke3chang under APT25 instead [5]. | vendor cross-map | [34][38][6][5] |
| Vixen Panda | CrowdStrike | CrowdStrike’s profile maps Vixen Panda to APT15, ke3chang, NICKEL, Nylon Typhoon and Red Vulture [9]. Google lists Vixen Panda under APT25 [5]. | vendor cross-map | [9][5] |
| Flea | Symantec | “The Flea (aka APT15, Nickel)” [14]. The basis given is tool lineage (Graphican descends from Ketrican); no mapping method is stated. | vendor cross-map | [14] |
| Red Vulture | PwC (since 2021) | PwC’s name, defined as “Ke3chang, APT15, APT25, NICKEL” [15], and the actor PwC tied to the RedRelay proxy network [16][17]. It covers APT25 as well as APT15. Intrusion Truth repeats it [1]. | vendor cross-map | [15][16][17] |
| APT25Uncool · Sushi Roll · Tor | Google / Mandiant | Google’s page lists “Vixen Panda, Ke3chang” under APT25, not APT15 [5]. Microsoft 2021 and PwC fold both APT15 and APT25 into one cluster [10][15]. Google’s 2026 rename table omits APT25 [4]. The two names are not interchangeable. | overlap / disputed | [5][10][15] |
| BackdoorDiplomacyPlayful Taurus (Unit 42) | ESET; Palo Alto Unit 42 | ESET: BackdoorDiplomacy and APT15 “use the same techniques and tactics” [31], and links Ke3chang to it “with low confidence” [29]. Unit 42 merges them under Playful Taurus with no stated basis [30]. MITRE keeps them separate (G0135) [6]. | overlap / disputed | [31][29][30] |
| GREF | Lookout; ESET | Lookout ties its mobile actor to GREF, “also … referred to as APT15” [26]. ESET: “we are currently unable to link GREF to APT15” and tracks it separately [27]. | overlap / disputed | [26][27] |
| Unit 61046 / 8th TRB“CSF 8th Bureau” | Intrusion Truth only | The unit itself is documented: a 2017 Haidian government record lists “61046部队(三部八局)”, Unit 61046 as the Third Department’s 8th Bureau [48], matching Project 2049, which inferred a focus on Europe and “perhaps” the Middle East, Africa and Latin America from linguists’ skills [40]. The link to APT15 is Intrusion Truth’s alone: it adds “Unit 61046 and CSF 8th Bureau” as aliases [1] and says the 8th TRB “is responsible for APT15 activity” [2]. No vendor or government makes this attribution, and no source places the bureau in the post-2024 Cyberspace Force, whose reconnaissance bases are regional, not numbered [49][50]. | single-source claim | [1][2][48] |
Intrusion Truth’s July 2026 posts chain several claims together, from a procurement notice to “the 8th TRB is responsible for APT15 activity.” Each step rests on different evidence. Ghostwire retrieved the procurement notices from the Internet Archive, including a second Chanming award that Intrusion Truth does not quote; they confirm the purchases, but not the buyers’ units or the products’ identity.
Every cyber-related notice Ghostwire found, plus the Cyberspace Force’s supplier actions, is on the PLA cyber procurement page.
| Step | Claim | What it rests on | Strength |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A Beijing military unit sought an “anti-traceback anonymous network system” service in 2023 and ranked Guangdong Chanming first. | Primary procurement notice, archived July 2025 [3]. | Documented |
| 2 | Chanming is a real Foshan information-security company. | Registry aggregator, recruiting page, provincial tech-SME list [41]. | Documented (secondary registries) |
| 2b | Chanming won a second military award in March 2024, a “network access platform” for an unnamed unit in Haikou, Hainan; Project 2049 placed a major 8th Bureau office in Haikou. | Primary procurement notice found by Ghostwire’s archive crawl [51]; Project 2049 [40]. The notice names no unit or product, so the Haikou overlap is consistent with the unit claim, not evidence of it. | Documented award; link inferred |
| 2c | Anti-traceback network services are a recurring military purchase. | A separate June 2024 tender sought a “反溯源匿名网络专线服务” for three users, with the provider assisting “information collection” on specific organizations and people [52]. No supplier named. | Documented tender |
| 3 | Chanming’s product grew out of the FCN tunnel tool published by one of its founders. | Intrusion Truth’s comparison of FCN and STN interfaces, code and binaries [1]. | Single source |
| 4 | FCN-derived WHIPWEAVE connects to an ORB network called Orbweaver. | Symantec, with no actor attribution [19]. | Documented (vendor) |
| 5 | Chanming’s product is RedRelay. | Intrusion Truth: “presumably RedRelay” [1]. The notice names no product brand [3]. | Inference |
| 6 | The buyer is Unit 61046, the 8th Technical Reconnaissance Base. | Intrusion Truth says the customer was “listed as Unit 61046” [2]; the archived notice names only “北京市某单位” in Haidian [3]. That Unit 61046 is the 3PLA 8th Bureau is documented [48][40]; the address Intrusion Truth gives matches public records [48]. Its post-2015 placement is only “assessed” [49], and “8th Technical Reconnaissance Base” appears in no other source [50]. | Unit identity documented; buyer link not shown |
| 7 | The 8th TRB is APT15. | Leaked eDiary files from an unnamed source, plus a domain cited from a Bitdefender paper that never mentions APT15 [2][32]. Intrusion Truth’s own hedge: “either … using the same infrastructure as APT15 … or the 8th TRB is APT15” [2]. Project 2049’s inferred regional focus is consistent with APT15’s foreign-ministry targeting, but is not evidence of it [40]. | Single source, hedged |
| 8 | APT15 uses RedRelay. | PwC ties Red Vulture (APT15 and APT25) to RedRelay [16]; Intrusion Truth’s “we do know” cites nothing [2]. Relay networks are shared by multiple groups [18]. | Documented for Red Vulture; not exclusive |
Groups share tools and infrastructure, so a tool is not proof of attribution. Google says APT15 “uses backdoors and infrastructure that are not unique to the group” [5]. The BS2005 lineage (TidePool, RoyalCli, Ketrican, Graphican) is the most consistent thread across vendors [37][36][14]. A dashed border marks tools or networks that sources also tie to other clusters.
Windows backdoors communicating over HTTP through the Internet Explorer COM interface; file transfer and shell.
Windows remote-access trojan (Visual C++) that profiles the host and runs commands.
Windows RAT: file operations, command execution, HTTP C2.
RoyalCli: backdoor evolved from BS2005, using IE injection. RoyalDNS: backdoor with C2 over DNS TXT records. spwebmember: .NET SharePoint database dumper.
Okrum: DLL backdoor with its payload hidden in a PNG. Ketrican: backdoor descended from BS2005; KetriADS loads it from an alternate data stream. Ketrum: Ketrican/Okrum hybrid.
Windows backdoors; several use the IE COM interface for C2.
Graphican: backdoor using the Microsoft Graph API and OneDrive for C2, evolved from Ketrican. EWSTEW: extracts sent and received mail from Exchange.
Windows (and Linux) backdoor: reverse shell, C2 update, system information.
Android and iOS surveillanceware: location, contacts, SMS, call recording (Android).
Android surveillance families.
Covert proxy (ORB) network of relay nodes used to hide the origin of intrusions. Infrastructure, not malware.
Relay network used for reconnaissance scanning and exploitation.
Tunnelling client “likely derived from the open-source Chinese VPN Free Connect (FCN) project” that connects to the Orbweaver ORB network.
reverse_ssh-based backdoor.
Mimikatz and variants, Quarks PwDump, Lazagne, SharpSecDump; web shells China Chopper, Behinder, Godzilla, AntSword; leaked EternalBlue-family exploits and DoublePulsar; impacket.
| When | Vector | What the source says | Attributed by | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nov 2023 and Mar 2024 notices; Jul 2026 claims | Procurement of an “anti-traceback anonymous network system” | A Beijing military unit ranked Guangdong Chanming first for an anonymity network service in 2023 [3], and an unnamed unit in Haikou did so for a “network access platform” in 2024 [51]. Intrusion Truth says this product is RedRelay and the buyer is Unit 61046 [1][2]. See the evidence chain. | Intrusion Truth only, for the RedRelay and unit links [1][2] | [3][51][1][2] |
| 2019–2026 | Relay (ORB) networks | Mandiant: SPACEHOP used by “APT5 and APT15” [18]. PwC: Red Vulture’s use of RedRelay, rebuilt March 2022 [16]. SentinelOne: an ORB network used by “several” actors, “particularly” one overlapping APT15 [20][21]. BSI: the group uses its own obfuscation networks [22]. Mandiant: such networks “are not controlled by a single APT actor” [18]. | Several vendors; infrastructure is shared [18][16][20] | [18][16][20][22] |
| Reported 29 Apr 2025 | Not stated | A U.S.–Guatemala joint review “identified the presence of advanced persistent threat APT-15 … within certain Guatemalan government systems” [23]. | U.S. Department of Defense with Guatemala (government statement) [23] | [23] |
| Jun–Dec 2023 | Not stated | Foreign-affairs entities in Brazil, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Peru, Portugal, France, Spain, Italy and the UK; some IT companies [24]. | Microsoft (Nylon Typhoon) [24] | [24] |
| 2018–2024 | Trojanized apps | BadBazaar on Android and iOS against Tibetans and Uyghurs; iOS variant “attributed with high confidence” to APT15 [25]. ESET tracks the Android campaign’s operator GREF separately [27]; the 2025 NCSC advisory names no actor [28]. | Lookout (APT15); disputed by ESET [25][27] | [25][27][28] |
| Jan 2023 | Not stated | KetriADS loader with a new Ketrican variant, plus Okrum, against an EU government body [29]. | ESET (Ke3chang) [29] | [29] |
| Jul–Dec 2022 | Not stated | Updated Turian backdoor; several Iranian government networks “have likely been compromised” [30]. | Unit 42 (Playful Taurus, merged with BackdoorDiplomacy) [30] | [30] |
| Late 2022 – early 2023 | Not stated; toolset includes a CVE-2020-1472 (Netlogon) exploit | Foreign ministries mainly in the Americas, a finance department, a corporation and one European victim [14]. | Symantec (“Flea (aka APT15, Nickel)”) [14] | [14] |
| 2021 | Not stated | “infrastructure previously linked to APT15” targeting a Canada-based mining company [45]. | Recorded Future (infrastructure link) [45] | [45] |
| Sept 2019 – Dec 2021 | Compromised VPN suppliers, phished credentials, unpatched Exchange and SharePoint, a Pulse Secure zero-day (no CVE IDs given) | Governments, diplomatic entities and NGOs in the Americas and Europe; Microsoft obtained a U.S. court order to take control of NICKEL websites [10][11]. | Microsoft (NICKEL; “some common activity” with APT15, APT25, KeChang) [10] | [10][11] |
| 2015–2019 | Not determined | Ketrican and Okrum against diplomatic missions in Slovakia, Belgium, Chile, Guatemala and Brazil; 2015 Ketrican activity in Croatia and the Czech Republic [34]. | ESET (Ke3chang, “high confidence”) [34] | [34] |
| 2017; reported Mar 2018 | Not stated; re-entry via stolen VPN certificate | Intrusion at a contractor providing services to the UK government; RoyalCli and RoyalDNS evolved from BS2005; SharePoint and Exchange dumping [36]. | NCC Group (APT15) [36] | [36] |
| 2012–2015 samples; reported 2016 | Office exploit CVE-2015-2545 | TidePool RAT against “Indian embassy personnel worldwide”; “an evolution of the BS2005 malware family” [37]. | Unit 42 (“related to the original Operation Ke3chang”) [37] | [37] |
| 2010–2013 | Spear-phishing; CVE-2012-4681 (Java, zero-day at the time), CVE-2010-3333, CVE-2010-2883 | “nine compromises at government ministries in five different European countries,” Syria-themed lures before the 2013 G20 [38]. | FireEye (“Ke3chang”; identities “remain unknown”) [38] | [38] |
| 2012 (tracked from Apr 2012) | Spear-phishing with fake-PDF droppers | Mirage RAT against an oil company in the Philippines, a Taiwanese military organization, a Canadian energy company and targets in Brazil, Israel, Egypt and Nigeria [39]. | SecureWorks names no actor; the APT15 link is later reporting [35][36] | [39][35] |
Government response. The Foreign Ministry’s press conferences of 28–31 July 2026 contain no question on Intrusion Truth, APT15 or Guangdong Chanming. The ministry’s usual answer to hacking accusations reads: “中方坚决反对并依法打击黑客活动,同时坚决反对出于政治目的散布虚假信息” (China firmly opposes and cracks down on hacking in accordance with the law, and firmly opposes spreading disinformation for political purposes) [43]. That quotation comes from a different case and is shown only as the standard formula.
Chinese security vendors. No Chinese vendor in this set tracks APT15 under its own name. It appears in Chinese only through translations of Western research, and 360’s APT naming scheme covers only foreign groups [46].
The company. 广东蝉鸣信息科技有限公司 (Guangdong Chanming Information Technology), registered in Nanhai District, Foshan, in August 2016, formerly 广州蝉鸣, describes itself as an information-security start-up [41]. Its name appears first among three candidates in the 2023 notice “反溯源匿名网络系统服务项目” (anti-traceback anonymous network system service project) at ¥30,000 per year [3], and first in a March 2024 “网络接入平台” (network access platform) award for an unnamed unit in Haikou at ¥90,000 [51]. A June 2024 tender from another unit for an anti-traceback network service shows the same category of purchase, with bidders required to have experience on military, state-security and public-security cyber projects [52]. Ghostwire found no Chinese-language coverage of the Intrusion Truth story [46].
CVEs named in the reporting on this cluster. None is in Ghostwire’s vulnerability records, which hold few CVEs from before 2020, and the CNNVD lookup was blocked from outside China [47]. Microsoft’s 2021 NICKEL reporting names no CVE IDs [10]. Several CVEs that appear near APT15 in relay-network reporting belong to other clusters, such as CVE-2022-27518 (APT5) and CVE-2024-8963 (UNC5174) [18][20], and are not listed here.
| CVE | Product | Where reported | Ghostwire record | CNNVD / CNVD |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2010-3333 | Microsoft Word (RTF stack overflow) | Ke3chang lures, 2010–2013 [38] | Not in Ghostwire’s records | Lookup blocked [47] |
| CVE-2010-2883 | Adobe Reader (CoolType) | Ke3chang lures, 2010–2013 [38] | Not in Ghostwire’s records | Lookup blocked [47] |
| CVE-2012-4681 | Oracle Java 7 | Ke3chang; exploited before a patch existed [38] | Not in Ghostwire’s records | Lookup blocked [47] |
| CVE-2015-2545 | Microsoft Office (EPS) | TidePool against Indian embassies [37] | Not in Ghostwire’s records | Lookup blocked [47] |
| CVE-2020-1472 | Netlogon (Zerologon) | Exploit in the Flea / Graphican toolset [14] | Not in Ghostwire’s records | Lookup blocked [47] |
| CVE-2020-5902 | F5 BIG-IP TMUI | BackdoorDiplomacy initial access (overlap only, not APT15 directly) [31] | Not in Ghostwire’s records | Lookup blocked [47] |
| CVE-2020-0688 | Microsoft Exchange | Script in the leaked eDiary, per Intrusion Truth only [2] | Not in Ghostwire’s records | Lookup blocked [47] |
Source review: 20 November 2026. Each entry says how it was checked: read in full, read through a summarizing fetch tool, excerpt only, or could not be opened.