Published: October 28, 2026 | Last Modified: October 28, 2026
Echo is a Go web framework. Prior to 4.16.0 and 5.4.0, Context.Scheme unconditionally trusts forwarded scheme headers from any client. A client that reaches Echo directly over plaintext HTTP can claim an HTTPS scheme and bypass HTTPSRedirect because the request is treated as already secure. Separately, behind a TLS-terminating proxy that passes an attacker-controlled header, a claimed HTTP scheme can suppress the Strict-Transport-Security header even though the browser receives the response over HTTPS. The practical risk is reduced when a trusted proxy overwrites the headers and direct backend access is prevented, but the framework previously had no trusted-source configuration for this decision. This issue is fixed in 4.16.0 and 5.4.0.
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