Published: October 13, 2026 | Last Modified: October 13, 2026
The Salty documentation repository builds and deploys the docs.saltbox.dev website. Prior to commit 649c9aea2daef1168eeb0415b44e65dbbde9f220, .github/workflows/trigger-pr-build.yml records an untrusted fork commit in the pr_info artifact, and the secret-bearing workflow_run job in .github/workflows/build-pr.yml checks out that commit before running pip install -r requirements.txt. A fork pull request can therefore supply attacker-authored setup.py or PEP 517 build hooks whose installation code executes in the privileged base-repository workflow with CF_API_TOKEN, GH_TOKEN, MKDOCS_GIT_COMMITTERS_APIKEY, and a write-capable GITHUB_TOKEN, allowing secret disclosure and follow-on compromise. The vulnerability is not caused by the repository-fork guard, and the demonstrated path requires attacker control of fork content rather than merely the artifact metadata. This vulnerability is fixed with commit 649c9aea2daef1168eeb0415b44e65dbbde9f220.
This analysis is generated by Ghostwire from NVD, CISA KEV, EPSS, and open-source intelligence data. Verify findings through primary sources before acting.