Published: August 22, 2026 | Last Modified: August 22, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: packet: use consistent hard_header_len in TX_RING send path tpacket_snd() reads dev->hard_header_len independently for skb allocation and header construction in tpacket_fill_skb(). Concurrent netdevice reconfiguration can therefore make the reserved headroom smaller than the amount later pushed, or make copylen - hard_header_len negative. Snapshot hard_header_len once before processing ring frames and use it for the frame limit, headroom allocation, copy length, and skb construction. Pass the snapshot to tpacket_fill_skb(). The separate SOCK_DGRAM consistency problem between hard_header_len and header_ops->create is not addressed here.
This analysis is generated by Ghostwire from NVD, CISA KEV, EPSS, and open-source intelligence data. Verify findings through primary sources before acting.