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Reference · China cyber organization · PLA

PLA cyber forces: structure and attributions

Since April 2024 the PLA’s cyber operations sit in the Cyberspace Force (网络空间部队), which reports directly to the Central Military Commission [5]. It inherited the former Third Department’s signals-intelligence bureaus through the Strategic Support Force [2][3], but where most bureaus ended up is not public [9]. Governments have charged PLA personnel by unit, Unit 61398 in 2014 and the 54th Research Institute in 2020, without naming an APT [24][25]; the links between named APT groups and PLA units come from vendors, or from single sources [12][15]. This page separates documented facts from analyst assessments and single-source claims.

Source review: 20 November 2026

Organization chart

Select a box to read a short explanation. The tables below hold the full evidence.

Top: the structure since April 2024. Bottom: former Third Department bureaus and military-region bureaus, with what the sources show about their move into the SSF. Of these, only the former 6th Bureau has a documented place in the Cyberspace Force [9].

Timeline

WhenWhat changedSources
before 2015General Staff Department Third Department (3PLA): 12 operational bureaus for signals intelligence and cyber reconnaissance; separate technical reconnaissance bureaus (TRBs) in each military region; the Ministry of State Security alongside.[1][4]
2015/16The Strategic Support Force (SSF) is created. Its Network Systems Department (NSD) absorbs 3PLA and “maintains the former Third Department’s headquarters, location, and internal bureau-centric structure.” Only three former bureaus are confirmed to have moved; the rest are assessed.[2][3]
19 Apr 2024The SSF is abolished. The NSD becomes the Cyberspace Force (网络空间部队), the Space Systems Department the Aerospace Force, and a new Information Support Force is built on the SSF Information and Communication Base (Unit 61001). All three report directly to the CMC.[5][6][7][8]
2025The Cyberspace Force is described as five regional technical reconnaissance bases (Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern, Central) plus a Cyberspace Operations Base. Bases are named by region, not numbered.[9]
Aug 2024The Cyberspace Force announces, on the military procurement portal, an inspection of procurement violations by its subordinate units.[17]
Two meanings of “TRB”. Before 2015, a TRB was a technical reconnaissance bureau, either one of the Third Department’s twelve or a military region’s own [1][3]. In the Cyberspace Force, a TRB is a regional technical reconnaissance base, named by region rather than numbered [9]. “8th Technical Reconnaissance Base” appears only in Intrusion Truth [15].

Units

Military Unit Cover Designators (MUCDs) are the five-digit numbers the PLA uses publicly for its units. The identity of Unit 61046 as the former 8th Bureau rests on a Beijing district government record, not only on analysts [10].

MUCDUnitLocationWhere it wentAPT attributionSources
617863PLA 1st BureauBeijing (Hanjiachuan area)Assessed moved to NSDNone in this set[1][3]
613983PLA 2nd Bureau—Assessed moved to NSDAPT1 (Mandiant, vendor) [12]; five officers indicted by DOJ, 2014, without an APT name [24][1][12][24]
614193PLA 4th Bureau (per Project 2049, via Recorded Future)—Recorded Future: “most likely” an SSF NSD bureauTick: Japan says a PLA unit directed it; the number 61419 comes via media and vendors [29][30][30][32]
617263PLA 6th Bureau—Documented: CSF Eastern TRBNone in this set[9]
610463PLA 8th BureauHaidian: Hanjiachuan; 遗光寺8号院; an office in HaikouAssessed moved to NSD; CSF placement unknownAPT15: Intrusion Truth only, hedged [15][10][1][11][3][16]
614863PLA 12th BureauShanghaiAssessed moved to NSDPutter Panda: CrowdStrike, “likely on behalf of” [13][1][13]
69010Lanzhou MR 2nd TRBÜrümqiMoved “largely intact” to SSF NSDRedFoxtrot: Recorded Future [26][4][14][26]
65016 / 65017Shenyang MR TRBShenyangRecorded Future: now Northern Theater CommandTonto Team: FireEye “possibly”; designator disputed [27][28][14][27][28][32]
78020Chengdu MR 2nd TRBKunmingNot tracedNaikon: ThreatConnect/Defense Group [14][14]
—54th Research Institute (former 4PLA; network and electronic countermeasures R&D)—“Transferred to NSD”; post-2024 place unknownEquifax intrusion: four members indicted by DOJ, 2020; no APT name [25][31][3][25]
32081CSF Central TRB香山南路8号院, HaidianSince 2024None in this set[9]
32087CSF Cyberspace Operations Base—Since 2024None in this set[9]
61001SSF Information and Communication Base → Information Support Force—Since Apr 2024None in this set[5]

APT attributions to PLA units

Groups share tools and infrastructure, and a cluster name can cover more than one team, so an attribution to a unit is only as strong as its evidence. Government indictments name people and units; vendor attributions rest on technical and open-source evidence; a single uncorroborated source is weaker still. No government document in this set names both an APT and a PLA unit.

APTUnitStrengthBasisSources
APT1 (Comment Crew)Unit 61398, 3PLA 2nd BureauVendor; unit officers indictedMandiant 2013 (“bolsters the claim that APT1 is Unit 61398”); DOJ 2014 indicted five Unit 61398 officers but did not name APT1[12][24]
(Equifax intruders)54th Research InstituteGovernmentDOJ 2020 indicted four members; names no APT[25]
TickA PLA unit; 61419 per media and vendorsGovernment (unit unnamed) + vendorJapan: “under the direction of a unit of the People’s Liberation Army”; Recorded Future: attribution to 61419 “difficult to confirm”[29][30]
RedFoxtrotUnit 69010, former Lanzhou MR 2nd TRBVendorRecorded Future 2021, partly from operator mistakes revealing the unit’s headquarters[26]
Tonto TeamShenyang MR TRB (65016 or 65017)Vendor, hedgedFireEye “possibly Unit 65017”; other sources say 65016[27][28]
Putter PandaUnit 61486, 3PLA 12th BureauVendorCrowdStrike 2014: “likely on behalf of”[13]
NaikonUnit 78020, Chengdu MR 2nd TRBVendorThreatConnect/Defense Group 2015, from infrastructure analysis and research on one officer[14]
APT15 (RIVER CASTLE)Unit 61046, 3PLA 8th BureauSingle source, hedgedIntrusion Truth 2026; no vendor or government agrees. See the APT15 dossier.[15]

What the procurement record shows

The PLA publishes tenders and awards on its procurement portal (军队采购网), run by the CMC Logistic Support Department. Buyers are named only as “某部” or “某单位” (a certain unit). The portal is unreachable from outside China; Ghostwire read Internet Archive copies of 807 notices, of which about ten are cyber-related [23]. Contact details are removed from every copy Ghostwire keeps.

Every cyber-related notice Ghostwire found, plus the Cyberspace Force’s supplier actions, is on the PLA cyber procurement page.

DateWhat was boughtSupplier / buyerSource
13 Aug 2024Cyberspace Force inspection of procurement violations in its units—[17]
7 Jun 2024Supplier suspended from Cyberspace Force procurement over a “网络攻防态势感知系统” (network attack-and-defence situational-awareness system) tender, project 2020-BDZZXD-3024江苏引跑网络科技有限公司, Nanjing; issued by the Cyberspace Force Logistics Department’s materiel supply office[33]
30 Nov 2023Anti-traceback anonymous network system service (award)广东蝉鸣 first, ¥30,000/yr; unnamed Haidian unit[18]
21 Mar 2024Network access platform (award)广东蝉鸣 first, ¥90,000; unnamed Haikou unit[19]
20 Jun 2024Anti-traceback anonymous network dedicated-line service (tender), with “information collection” supportNo supplier; Guangzhou; bidders need military/state-security/public-security cyber record[20]
9 Dec 2024Vulnerability-mining assistance platform: firmware analysis, OKL4 emulation and debugging (intention)Budget ¥1.8M[21]
8 Apr 2025On-premises deep-learning model for vulnerability analysis (award)科大国创 first (¥1.87M), 奇安信网神 second[22]

What no source in this set establishes

Sources

Source review: 20 November 2026. Each entry says how it was checked.

  1. Mark Stokes, Jenny Lin and L.C. Russell Hsiao, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Signals Intelligence and Cyber Reconnaissance Infrastructure,” Project 2049 Institute, 11 Nov 2011. Read in full. Maps the General Staff Third Department (3PLA) bureaus to unit cover designators, including “Eighth Bureau (61046 Unit)”, First Bureau (61786), Second Bureau (61398, “premier entity targeting the United States and Canada”) and Twelfth Bureau (61486). Regional focus is inferred from linguists’ skills and hedged (“appears to”, “perhaps”). On cyber roles: “Specific Third Department bureaus with responsibilities for CNE remain opaque.” project2049.net (PDF)
  2. John Costello, written testimony to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 15 Feb 2018. Read in full. “The Network Systems Department maintains the former Third Department’s headquarters, location, and internal bureau-centric structure.” uscc.gov (PDF)
  3. John Costello and Joe McReynolds, “China’s Strategic Support Force: A Force for a New Era,” NDU China Strategic Perspectives 13, Oct 2018. NDU URL returned HTTP 403; read in full from an Internet Archive capture. Calls the 3PLA bureaus “technical reconnaissance bureaus [jishu zhengcha ju, 技术侦察局]”. Table 3: “Eighth Bureau (Beijing) — Assessed to be transferred to NSD”; “only three of the former bureaus can be fully confirmed to have moved into the NSD, this most likely reflects incomplete public data.” ndupress.ndu.edu (PDF)
  4. Seth G. Jones et al., “Competing without Fighting,” CSIS, Aug 2023. Read in full. Before 2015 China “had three departments overseeing cyber activities: the PLA, which operated 12 specialized operation bureaus; Technical Reconnaissance Bureaus (TRB) for each military region; and the Ministry of State Security.” “Unit 69010 pre-2015 was the Lanzhou Military Region’s second TRB. In the reorganization, it was reassigned largely intact to the SSF NSD.” Confirms that “DOJ indicted five 3PLA computer network operators in 2014.” csis.org (PDF)
  5. IISS (Meia Nouwens), “China’s new Information Support Force,” 3 May 2024. Live page HTTP 403; read in full from an Internet Archive capture. “On 19 April 2024 … the CMC announced the end of the PLA’s Strategic Support Force (SSF)… The SSF’s Aerospace Systems and Network Systems departments appear to have been re-designated as the Aerospace Force (ASF, 军事航天部队) and Cyberspace Force (CSF, 网络空间部队), respectively, and all three bodies will now report directly to the PLA’s CMC.” The ISF “is likely to be based around the SSF’s former Information and Communication Base (信息通信基地)… also known as 61001部队.” iiss.org
  6. J. Michael Dahm, “A Disturbance in the Force: The Reorganization of People’s Liberation Army Command and Elimination of China’s Strategic Support Force,” Jamestown China Brief, 26 Apr 2024. Excerpt only. The reorganization “subordinated the SSD and NSD—now designated the Military Aerospace Force (ASF) and Cyberspace Force (CSF), respectively” to the CMC; “The ISF did not replace the SSF.” jamestown.org
  7. Joe Keary, “Four services and four arms lifts CCP control over information warfare,” ASPI The Strategist, 24 May 2024. Excerpt only. The Aerospace Force and Cyberspace Force “are likely to be redesigns of the former SSF Aerospace Systems and Network Systems departments”; “Together the three organisations will manage offensive and defensive PLA information capabilities.” aspistrategist.org.au
  8. Lauryn Williams, “Force Design for the Twenty-First Century Fight: US Cyber Force Lessons from China’s Strategic Support Force,” CSIS, 19 Nov 2025. Excerpt only. “The network systems department served as the hub for cyber forces”; after “the PLA abruptly dissolved the SSF”, the Aerospace, Cyberspace and Information Support Forces “were shifted directly under the CMC.” csis.org
  9. John Costello, “The Cyberspace Force: A Bellwether for Conflict,” Jamestown China Brief vol. 25 no. 8, 25 Apr 2025. Read in full. The Cyberspace Force has “five regional ‘Technical Reconnaissance Bases’ (TRB; 技术侦查基地)… composed of former military region, service-level, and, in some cases, former … 3PLA … technical reconnaissance bureaus”; the Central TRB is “Unit 32081 … No. 8 Xiangshan South Road, Haidian District, Beijing (北京市海淀区香山南路8号院)”; the Cyberspace Operations Base is Unit 32087; the former 3PLA 6th Bureau (61726) went to the Eastern TRB. Does not mention the 8th Bureau or 61046. jamestown.org (PDF)
  10. Haidian District government information disclosure, 2017 winter-relief donation list for units in Qinglongqiao subdistrict, index 11F/2017-08589, 19 May 2017. Read in full. Row: “61046部队(三部八局)” — Unit 61046 (Third Department, 8th Bureau). Names no mission or later subordination. bjhd.gov.cn
  11. Other public mentions of 61046部队: Xinhua, 27 Aug 2014, a Xi Jinping commendation order awarding a second-class merit to a “61046部队研究员” (read); Nankai University careers page giving “北京市海淀区遗光寺8号院” (undated, read); a 2003 recruitment repost describing “总参直属高科技科研部队” working on mathematics, communications, signals, satellites, computers and foreign languages (unofficial repost, read). None states a regional focus, a cyber role, or its place after 2015. xinhuanet.com · nankai.edu.cn
  12. Mandiant, “APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units,” Feb 2013. Read in full (Google-hosted copy and an Internet Archive capture). “APT1 is believed to be the 2nd Bureau of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department’s (GSD) 3rd Department (总参三部二局), which is most commonly known by its Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) as Unit 61398 (61398部队).” Mandiant notes its conclusions “are based exclusively on unclassified, open source information” and writes that the evidence “bolsters the claim that APT1 is Unit 61398.” This is a vendor attribution: the 2014 indictment names Unit 61398 officers but not APT1 [24]. Archived report (PDF)
  13. CrowdStrike, “Hat-tribution to PLA Unit 61486,” 9 Jun 2014. Excerpt only. Putter Panda operates “likely on behalf of the Chinese PLA 3rd Department 12th Bureau Unit 61486.” Report: “a cyber espionage group operating out of Shanghai, China, with connections to the People’s Liberation Army Third General Staff Department (GSD) 12th Bureau Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) 61486, since 2012” (report PDF read in full). crowdstrike.com
  14. ThreatConnect and Defense Group Inc., “Project CameraShy: Closing the Aperture on China’s Unit 78020,” Sep 2015. Read in full from the National Security Archive copy (ThreatConnect’s own PDF returned HTTP 403). “ThreatConnect®, in partnership with Defense Group Inc., has attributed targeted cyber espionage infrastructure activity associated with the ‘Naikon’ Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) group to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Chengdu Military Region Second Technical Reconnaissance Bureau (Military Unit Cover Designator 78020),” based partly on research into one PLA officer; the unit “operates primarily out of Kunming.” Appendix B lists the ten military-region TRB designators, including Lanzhou MR 2nd TRB, Urumqi, 69010, and Shenyang MR TRB, 65016. nsarchive.gwu.edu (PDF)
  15. Intrusion Truth, “Dear Diary, Today I found a Ghost in the Network” (27 Jul 2026) and “Turns out the Ghost was the PLA” (28 Jul 2026). Read in full. Adds “Unit 61046 and CSF 8th Bureau” as aliases of APT15 and says “the 8th TRB is responsible for APT15 activity,” while hedging that “either the 8th TRB is using the same infrastructure as APT15 … or the 8th TRB is APT15.” No other source uses “8th Technical Reconnaissance Base”. part 1 · part 2
  16. 黃郁文 (Huang Yu-wen), “中共軍事作戰支援能力:戰略支援部隊,” INDSR (Taiwan) special issue, Dec 2022. Relevant chapter read. Table 1 lists “第八局 61046部隊 歐洲、中東、非洲、南美資訊採集”; its stated sources are Project 2049 and a 2021 Korean paper, so it repeats rather than corroborates. indsr.org.tw (PDF)
  17. 军队采购网, “网络空间部队网上采购违规问题专项核查整治公告,” 13 Aug 2024. Read from an Internet Archive capture. The Cyberspace Force announces a special inspection of online-procurement violations in “网络空间部队所属单位” (units under the Cyberspace Force), confirming that it buys through the military procurement portal. Contact details omitted. Archived notice
  18. 军队采购网, “反溯源匿名网络系统服务项目成交公示,” project 2023-JWHJCM-F4005, 30 Nov 2023. Read from Internet Archive captures. First candidate 广东蝉鸣信息科技有限公司 at ¥30,000 per year; buyer “北京市某单位”, Haidian. Names no unit. Contact details omitted. Archived notice
  19. 军队采购网, “网络接入平台采购(二次招标)中标结果公告,” project 2023-JYBNOX-F1003, 21 Mar 2024. Read from an Internet Archive capture. First candidate 广东蝉鸣信息科技有限公司 at ¥90,000; buyer “某部”, Haikou, Hainan. Names no unit or product. Contact and evaluator details omitted. Archived notice
  20. 军队采购网, “反溯源匿名网络专线服务采购项目招标公告,” project 2024-JWHJNH-F4004, 20 Jun 2024. Read from an Internet Archive capture. Describes secure access to foreign internet that prevents users being “被境外有关机构追踪” and a provider that will “辅助对特定机构、人员相关信息的信息搜集工作”; three users, ¥180,000; bidders need experience on “军队(国安、公安)网络安全项目”. A tender; no supplier named. Contact details omitted. Archived notice
  21. 军队采购网, “某漏洞挖掘辅助平台采购意向公告,” 9 Dec 2024 (category: other security equipment). Read from an Internet Archive capture. One platform for firmware security analysis and “基于定制化的QEMU仿真器动态模拟运行基于ARM处理器的OKL4操作系统” with remote dynamic debugging; budget ¥1,800,000; planned March 2025. An intention notice: no supplier. Archived notice
  22. 军队采购网, “面向漏洞分析领域的可私有化部署深度学习模型项目结果公示,” project 2024-YK01-F1242, 8 Apr 2025. Read from an Internet Archive capture. Ranking: 科大国创软件股份有限公司, 奇安信网神信息技术(北京)股份有限公司, 北京中科闻歌科技股份有限公司; award ¥1,868,800 to the first. Contact details omitted. Archived notice
  23. Ghostwire crawl of the Internet Archive’s copies of 军队采购网 notices, 20 Nov 2026: 807 archived notice URLs (2022–2026), a small fraction of the portal; most concern uniforms, food, medical supplies and construction. About ten are cyber-related. The live portal timed out from outside China. Contact details are stripped from every stored copy.
  24. U.S. Department of Justice, “U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers for Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations and a Labor Organization for Commercial Advantage,” 19 May 2014. Read in full from an Internet Archive capture. “Defendants: Wang Dong, Sun Kailiang, Wen Xinyu, Huang Zhenyu, and Gu Chunhui, who were officers in Unit 61398 of the Third Department of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA).” Does not mention APT1, Mandiant or the 2nd Bureau. justice.gov
  25. U.S. Department of Justice, “Chinese Military Personnel Charged with Computer Fraud, Economic Espionage and Wire Fraud for Hacking into Credit Reporting Agency Equifax,” 10 Feb 2020. Read in full from an Internet Archive capture. Four defendants “were members of the PLA’s 54th Research Institute, a component of the Chinese military.” Names no APT. justice.gov
  26. Recorded Future Insikt Group, RedFoxtrot report (cta-2021-0616), 16 Jun 2021. Read in full from an Internet Archive capture. Ties RedFoxtrot to “People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Unit 69010 located in Ürümqi, Xinjiang”, “Formerly known as the Lanzhou Military Region’s Second Technical Reconnaissance Bureau”, which “has very likely been incorporated into the Network Systems Department of the PLA-SSF.” recordedfuture.com
  27. Nalani Fraser and Kelli Vanderlee, “Achievement Unlocked,” FireEye Cyber Defense Summit 2019 slides. Read from an Internet Archive capture. “Tonto Team (possibly Unit 65017) – Shenyang Military Region Technical Reconnaissance Bureau”; “Unclear how the TRBs have been incorporated into the SSF.” CameraShy’s table and a 2022 USCC statement give the Shenyang TRB as 65016, so the number is unresolved. fireeye.com (PDF)
  28. Recorded Future Insikt Group, TAG-74 report (cta-2023-0919), 19 Sep 2023. Read from an Internet Archive capture. TAG-74 overlaps Tonto Team, “a group publicly linked to the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) former Shenyang Military Region Technical Reconnaissance Bureau (now part of the Northern Theater Command)”; footnotes the FireEye slides and the 2022 USCC hearing.
  29. Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary, 20 Apr 2021, as reported by AP (via SecurityWeek): the 2016–17 JAXA intrusions were by “Tick” “under the direction of a unit of the People’s Liberation Army”; “The involvement of China’s People’s Liberation Army is highly likely.” The Record attributes the unit number, 61419, to Tokyo police via Japanese media; The Register says the minister named it himself. No Japanese primary text was found. securityweek.com · therecord.media
  30. Recorded Future Insikt Group, report on PLA Unit 61419 purchasing antivirus products, undated on page. Excerpt only. “Unit 61419 most likely continues to operate as an SSF NSD bureau focused at least in part on CNE operations”; “definitive attribution of Tick Group to Unit 61419 remains difficult to confirm at this time.” Cites Project 2049 for 61419 as the 3PLA 4th Bureau. recordedfuture.com
  31. John Costello, “The Strategic Support Force: Update and Overview,” Jamestown China Brief 16(19), 21 Dec 2016. Excerpt only. The Fourth Department (4PLA) was the “Electronic Countermeasure and Radar Department”; “Computer network attack (CNA) has traditionally been handled by the GSD Fourth Department”; “The 54th Research Institute, formerly subordinate to the 4PLA, appears to have moved to the SSF.” NDU later lists the 54th Research Institute as “Transferred to NSD” [3]. Not to be confused with CETC’s 54th Research Institute. jamestown.org
  32. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission hearing, 17 Feb 2022, transcript and prepared statements. Read. Includes Mandiant testimony that groups “affiliated with PLA Theater Commands, such as Tonto Team and TEMP.Overboard, appear to focus operations on regions within the areas of responsibility of their respective Theater Commands,” and an analyst table linking APT30/Naikon to Unit 78020, Tick to the 3PLA 4th Bureau (61419) and Tonto Team to the Shenyang TRB (65016). The same table labels APT1 the “1st Bureau”, contradicting Mandiant’s “2nd Bureau”. uscc.gov (PDF)
  33. 军队采购网, “关于江苏引跑网络科技有限公司暂停公告,” 7 Jun 2024, issued by “网络空间部队后勤部物资供应处” (Cyberspace Force Logistics Department, Materiel Supply Office). Read from an Internet Archive copy found by Ghostwire’s crawl. Suspends the supplier from “网络空间部队范围” procurement over suspected misconduct in the “网络攻防态势感知系统” tender, project 2020-BDZZXD-3024.